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Abstract
We examine the long-run implication of two models of learning with recency bias: recursive
weights and limited memory. We show that both models generate similar beliefs, and that both have
a weighted universal consistency property. Using the limited memory model we are able to produce
learning procedures that are both weighted universally consistent and converge with probability
one to strict Nash equilibrium, the ￿rst example of which we are aware of learning procedures that
have this convergence property and also have desirable properties for the individual agents who use
them.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: 001,002
Keywords: Learning, Recency, Fictitious Play, Game Theory, Universal Consistency
1. Introduction
There is substantial evidence from both the laboratory and the ￿eld that people display ￿re-
cency bias,￿ meaning that they react more heavily to recent observations and experiences than
they do to older ones. 3The magnitude of recency bias varies with the setting and the form of
feedback; in particular, some forms of summary statistics can make this bias very small. Recency
has been incorporated into both belief-based and reinforcement-based models of learning, by adding
a parameter that controls the speed of informational discounting (see, for example, Cheung and
Friedman (1997), Sutton and Barto (1998), Camerer and Ho (1999), Benaim, Hofbauer and
Hopkins (2009)), or by supposing that individuals retain only a ￿nite sample in their memory
(Young (1993)).
Here we investigate models of learning with recency. We consider both informational discounting
and ￿nite memory models, and show that the beliefs in the two models are roughly the same if
the ￿nite memory is large enough. Moreover in this case of little recency, both models satisfy a
weighted universal consistency property of achieving about as much utility as would be possible
as if the ￿informationally discounted￿ sample path were known in advance. This is a variation
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Preprint submitted to Mimeo: WUSTL December 17, 2013on a widely used non-Bayesian criterion for the success of a learning process based on the notion
of worst-case performance. The weighted universal consistency property generalizes the notion of
universal or Hannan consistency discussed, for example, in Fudenberg and Levine (1995). This
requires that regardless of the sample path in the long run the player does as well as if he knew
the time average of the sample ahead of time. For procedures that keep track only of averages (or
weighted averages) this is a sensible criterion for ￿success.￿ We also show that there are universally
consistent ￿nite-memory learning procedures that converge with probability one to strict Nash
equilibrium. This is the ￿rst result of this type of which we are aware: earlier results such as
Foster and Young (2006) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2013) give convergence results, but do not
show that the procedures have universal consistency properties. These results complement those of
Benaim, Hofbauer and Hopkins (2009), who related the long-run behavior of stochastic ￿ctitious
play with very little informational discounting to the smooth best response dynamic that describes
the asymptotic behavior of smooth ￿ctitious play without recency.
2. The Model
We consider a one person decision problem. Each period t = 1;2;:::the player chooses an
action a from a ￿nite set of actions A, then observes an outcome y 2 Y , a ￿nite set. The utility
from action a when the outcome is y is denoted by u(a;y). The space of probability distributions
over a (￿nite) set S is denoted by (S). Mixed actions are denoted by  2 (A), and mixed
outcomes by  2 (Y ). We will write u(;) for the expected utility to mixed actions and mixed
outcomes. A strategy for the player can depend only on the information available to him when he
moves, namely the past values of his own play and the outcome. A history of play for the player
is denoted by ht = (a1;y1;:::;at;yt), with h0 the null history and the space of all histories of play
denoted by H. A (behavior) strategy for the player is a map  : H ! (A), while an outcome
function is a map  : H ! (Y ). Each strategy-outcome function pair induces a stochastic process
over action/outcome pairs, where given the history ht 1 the conditional probability of at;yt, is
(ht 1)[at](ht 1)[yt]. In other words, the player and nature must base their play only on the
history of actions and outcomes. In some interpretations, the outcomes may be chosen by other
players rather than by nature.
3. Notions of Recency
3.1. Belief Based Strategies
A Markov belief based strategy consists of a prior belief 0 2 (Y ), a Markov kernel P(jt 1;yt)
that speci￿es how beliefs are updated, and a map (t 1) from beliefs at time t   1 to a mixed
action at time t. One such map is the best-response map; 4 we will also consider various smooth
approximations to the best-response map. For the moment we focus on modeling the evolution of
4Although this is not single-valued, we can make an arbitrary choice in case of indi￿erence.
2beliefs. In doing so, it will be convenient to de￿ne f(yjyt) to be equal to 1 if y = yt and 0 otherwise,
and f(yjht) = f(yjy), the indicator function for whether the period-  outcome was equal to y:
3.2. Recursive Weighting
We are given a weight 0 <  < 1 an initial condition 0 and the deterministic kernel (yjht) =
ft(yjht) + (1   )(yjht 1) where (yjh0)  0(y). We now show how this Markov belief process
is equivalent to several others.
3.3. Weighted Sampling
We de￿ne the weighted sample with respect to weight  > 1 by giving the tth observation
weight t ; this is equivalent to always weighting the most recent (time t) observation by 1 and
discounting observations at times t    by ! = 1= < 1:
To make this stationary and incorporate the e￿ect of the prior, we use weights stretching back
to  1. Speci￿cally, we de￿ne
(yjht) =
Pt
=1 f(yjht) +
P0
= 1 0(y)
Pt
= 1  =
ft(yjht) +
Pt 1
= 1 !t (yjht 1)
Pt
= 1 !t  :
In the latter form, it is clear that the relationship is recursive, and if we de￿ne
 =
t
Pt
= 1  = 1   !:
we can write this in the recursive weighted form at (yjht) = ft(yjht)+(1 )(yjht 1). Note
that  ! 1 corresponds to the case  !1 where only the most recent observation matters, while
Bayesian updating for a ￿xed unknown distribution of osbervations corresponds to a non-stationary
model in which  = 1andt ! 0:
3.4. Base Rate Neglect
In the case where the agent believes that  is generated by iid sampling, let t 2 ((Y )) be
beliefs over (y): Benjamin, Bodoh-Creed and Rabin (2013) propose a model of base rate neglect
with the updating rule
t() =
(yt)[t 1()]

(yt)[t 1()]d
:
Notice that if  = 1 this is ordinary Bayesian updating. If the prior is Dirichlet, the poste-
rior mean is simply the maximum of this function with respect to . For  6= 1 the posterior
mean is di￿cult to compute, so we continue to measure central tendency by taking the maxi-
mum of the function, that is, the posterior mode rather than mean. To consider the maximum
of this function with respect to , we can ignore the denominator and maximize the logarithm
log(yt) +  log[t 1()] =
Pt
=1 t  log(y) + t log0(). If we assume that the prior is such
that log0() =
P0
= 1   log(y) for some weighted ￿ctitious prior sample yj0
= 1 then we
3may write the log-likelihood with prior as log(yt) +  log[t 1()] =
Pt
= 1 t  log(y) and
the maximum likelihood is simply given by the weighted sample averages
^ (yjht) =
Pt
= 1  f(yjht)
Pt
= 1  
so that if we take  =  1 and de￿ne 0(y) = ^ (yjh0)this is exactly the same point belief as
generated by recency generated by weighted sampling.
3.5. Limited Memory
So far we have supposed in e￿ect that there is unlimited memory for past observations, or at
least that any value of  can be recorded in the memory. We now instead suppose that the memory
has size M where M refers to the number of observations that can be stored 5 Our goals are to
show that when M is large that the agent receives about the same utility as he would with in￿nite
memory, and also to examine the stationary distribution of play when the data is generated iid.
Then a k;p;M procedure where 0 < p  1;1  k  M proceeds as follows:
1. Choose randomly a subset of M of size k
2. Discard each observation in the subset independently and randomly with probability p
3. Replace all the discarded observations with the observation from the current period.
The simplest version of this procedure has k = 1;p = 1, that is, choose one observation at
random from memory and discard it. In this case when the signal y is i.i.d., the ergodic distribution
is multinomial.
The k;p procedure allows us to largely separate memory size M from ; while allowing the
construction of procedures with arbitrary values of .
Except in our existing case where it is multinomial, the stationary distribution of this procedure
while not intrinsically complicated (as in the case with deterministic weighting) does not seem
especially easy to compute.
In the k;p procedure the probability an observation is thrown out of the sample is pk=M. The
corresponding value of  should be M=pk.
4. Recursive Weighting versus Limited Memory
The recursive memory weighting model has a deterministic transition kernel and an in￿nite
state space. The limited memory model has random transitions and a ￿nite state space. The
latter has some advantages in analyzing properties such as universal consistency. In the case
where  generates iid values of y the stationary distribution of the recursive weighting model can
be extremely complicated and need not have a density even when y is binary. The stationary
distribution of the limited memory model always exists and in some cases is quite simple: in the
5Note that this di￿erent than the limited-history processes considered by Young (1993), where the memory always
contains the M most recent observations)
4case in which k = 1;p = 1 each observation is drawn from exactly the same distribution , so the
belief each period is simply a multinomial with M observations drawn from .6
We now want to relate the two models. Suppose that  = pk=M , so that the expected weight
that the limited-memory model gives to the most recent observation is the same as in the recursive
model, and initialize the two systems so that the distribution of observations in the limited memory
is the same as the prior 0 2 	k. Fix any sequence of observations yt and consider the deterministic
sequence t from recursive weighting and consider the random process ~ t from limited memory.
Then
Theorem 1. For any ￿xed  2 (0;1); as M ! 1 then E[j~ t   tj] ! 0 uniformly in t and the
sequence of observations (y1;y2;:::).
Proof. Fix the sequence ft, de￿ne
zt =
~ t   (1   )~ t 1

  ft
and observe that ~ t  t =
Pt
=1 tzt=t. Hence to prove the theorem it is su￿cient to prove that
E[jztj] ! 0.
Now let ` be the number of observations in updating to period t that are discarded and let
~ `
t 1 be the frequencies in the remaining sample. Note that we can think of this as drawing M   `
observations from ; ~ t 1 without replacement, and we arbitrarily de￿ne ~ M
t 1 = ~ t 1. Since  < 1 it
is less than some  < 1: Simple algebra shows that 7
E[jztjj~ t 1;`]  2

 

`
M
  1

 
 +
1   


Pr(` > (=
p
)M) + max
`(=
p
)M
E
h
 ~ t 1   ~ `
t 1

 

 ~ t 1;`
i
(4.1)
where the last line follows from the facts that both ~ `
t 1 ft ;and the di￿erence between ~ `
t 1 ;and
~ t 1 are all between 0 and 1.
Next we observe that EjXj  2
p
EjXj2 hence it is enough to prove that each of the expectations
on the RHS of 4.1 has square deviation that goes to zero. Examining ￿rst E
 

`
M   1
 

2
;recall that
 = pk=M and E` = pk, so we need only compute the variance of `
M. The variance of ` is
p(1   p)k = M(1   p) , so the variance of `
M is
M(1   p)
2M2 
1
M
.
Turning to the second term E

 ~ t 1   ~ `
t 1

 
2 
 ~ t 1;`

observe that E[~ `
t 1j~ t 1;`] = ~ t 1 and
that the variance is bounded above by sampling with replacement, which is at worst 1=(M  
(=
p
)M)  1=(M(1 
p
)). Hence max`L E
h
 ~ t 1   ~ `
t 1

 

 ~ t 1;`
i
 1=(M(1 
p
)) ! 0.
6The same is true in the limited-history model of Young (1993), where the agent always forgets the oldest
observation in the memory. However, that model does not ￿t our framework as it requires the state to keep track of
the order in which the observations were acquired.
7The details of this computation can be found in the Web Appendix.
55. Approximate Universal Consistency of Slightly Weighted Sampling
We continue to let t denote the beliefs of the weighted sampling scheme, and let t denote the
weighted beliefs through and including observations at time t excluding the prior .
Fix a scale parameter U > 0.
For any probability distribution  suppose for some 0 <   1 we de￿ne v(;) = u(;)+()
where  maps the interior of the simplex to the reals, is bounded by U, smooth, strictly di￿erentiably
concave and satis￿es the boundary condition that at  approaches the boundary of the simplex
the norm of the derivative becomes in￿nite. The function v(^ ();) is Lipschitz (Fudenberg and
Levine (1999)) and from the implicit function theorem the Lipschitz constant has the form BU=
where B depends only on . This perturbation of the utility function serves to induce mixing,
and allows the approximation of the best response function by the smoothed best response ^ () =
argmax v(;): Suppose suppose the agent at each date sets (ht) = ^ (t).
Let ut =
Pt
=1 u((h);f) be the total weighted expected utility received through period t
where ft is the distribution that places weight one on yt and let U() = max u(;) , t =
Pt
=1 
Past work (Fudenberg and Levine (1995) ) has shown that when  = 1 (no recency at all), the
rule (ht) = ^ (t) is " universally consistent, meaning that regardless of the probability law of
the yt; limsupt U(t)   ut=t  where  > 0 can be made arbitrarily small by taking the weight 
on the non-linear term  to be small.
To extend this to allow for recency (that is  > 1) de￿ne ct = tU(t)   ut, c0 = 0; where t
now varies with  We will show that when and  are small enough, limsupt!1 ct=t   for all
utility functions that satisfy the payo￿ bound U, and we will conclude that the learning procedure
is -universally consistent with respect to U.
To see why this terminology makes sense, note that in the case  = 1 this is the approximate
universal consistency condition described above, as ct=t reduces to U(t)   ut/t, The condition
 > 1 is stronger than  = 1 in that it places more weight on the next (unknown) observation than
on past observations. Hence, conceptually the bigger is  the stronger is the notion of universal
consistency.
Theorem 2. For any  there exists a constant B > 0 such that for all utility functions ju(a;y)j  U
the recursive memory model with parameters ; satis￿es ct=t  7Uj1=(t) +  + B=j.
The proof, which adapts the method used in Fudenberg and Levine (1999) in the case  = 1
can be found in the Web Appendix.
6. Convergence to Strict Nash Equilibrium
We study simultaneous move games with observable actions w(a1;a2;:::;an) . Say that a pure
action pro￿le is a -strict Nash equilibrium if each player loses at least  from deviating to any pure
action. Then we can show
Theorem 3. For any ; ;U there exist recursive-memory learning procedures that are -universally
consistent with respect to the payo￿ bound U for each player such that if jwj  U and the game
6w has a  U-strict Nash equilibrium then with probability one the learning procedures converge to
some strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Set 1 = =4 and 2 = =(4U) (and also smaller than 1/2). De￿ne yi = a i. For each player
choose a i such that u(ai;i)  u(~ ai;i) implies ^ i(i)[ai]  ^ i(i)[~ ai] (for example the entropy
function]. Next choose  su￿ciently small that two properties hold. First, 7U  1. Second, note
that as  ! 0 then ^  approaches the best response, so in particular the probability of a strict best
response goes to 1. Hence we can also choose  small enough that if ai is any  U-strict best response
then ^ i(i)[ai]  1   2. Then choose  such that 7UB=  1. This is 21 universally consistent
by Theorem 2. By Theorem 1 we can choose Mi large enough that UE[j~ i
t i
tj]  1, and suppose
that ki = Mi, that is, we potentially discard all observations. Then the procedure replacing i
t
with ~ i
t is 31 universally consistent, since the payo￿s remain within that distance. Now de￿ne a
procedure i(hi
t) such that if all the observations in the memory are identical and ^ i(i)[ai]  1 2
then i(i)[ai] = 1 (we call this the ￿stuck￿ state), otherwise, i(i)[ai] = ^ i(i)[ai]. This procedure
is no worse than 31 + U2 =  universally consistent.
Suppose that i; i is  U strict. and that i contains only these observations for i = 1;2;:::;n.
Then we see from construction that such a state is absorbing.
Next suppose that all players are in the stuck state. Observe that all must play a strict best
response, since the probability of a non-strict best response is less than 1/2 and so less than 2 in
the original procedure. If the best responses are identical to the samples, we are are absorbed in a
strict equilibrium. If not then the sample must change for all but one player, and in particular the
next period at least one player is not in the stuck state.
Now suppose that at least one player is not in the ￿stuck￿ state. Then that player plays an
action di￿erent than his last period action with a positive probability bounded below with a bound
that depends only on ; both of which are ￿xed, and with positive probability remains unstuck.
Hence the next period there is a positive probability that all players are unstuck. When all players
are unstuck there is a positive probability that all play the  U strict equilibrium action, and there
is a positive probability that all observations in all their samples are replaced with this action,
resulting in the absorbing state.
Notice that we do not assert that all weighted universally consistent learning procedures have
a convergence property. This is unlikely to be the case, since ? study smooth ￿ctitious play
with exponentially decreasing weights and show that the limit of the ergodic distribution as decay
vanishes is contained in a Birkhof center of the ￿ow of the corresponding mean ￿eld. They use this
to determine that in some games the process converges to (close to an) equilibrium while in others
it cycles.
What about mixed equilibria, or since mixed equilibrium will be di￿cult to hit with a ￿nite
number of states, mixed approximate equilibrium? Hart and Mas-Colell (2013) gives uncoupled
learning algorithms that converge with probability one to a mixed equilibrium. However Hart
and Mas-Colell (2013)’s learning procedures cannot be universally consistent because once in
equilibrium play never changes regardless of the data.. By contrast Foster and Young (2006)’s
procedure continues learning and does not converge with probability one to a Nash equilibrium,
but the set of Nash equilibria does have probability near one in the ergodic distribution. We do not
know if their procedure is universally consistent. At this point the issue of what sorts of extensions
of Theorem 3 apply to games with only mixed equilibria remains open; we hope to explore it in
7future work.
7. Conclusion
We examine two models of learning with recency, recursive weights and limited memory. These
are similar in the sense that have the same mean beliefs, and with high probability beliefs that
are very close. We show that recursive weights with suitably smoothed best responses is weighted
universally consistent, and argue that this is a sensible criterion. It follows that limited memory has
the same property provided the grid is ￿ne enough. This is useful because it can produce limited
memory algorithms that are weighted universally consistent and also converge with probability one
to strict Nash equilibrium. This is the ￿rst example of which we are aware of a learning processes
that has global convergence to Nash equilibrium and is also shown to satisfy any sort of criteria of
adequate responsiveness to individual incentives.
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8Web Appendix
Theorem. [Theorem 1 in text] For any ￿xed  2 (0;1); as M ! 1 then E[j~ t tj] ! 0 uniformly
in t and the sequence of observations (y1;y2;:::).
Proof. Fix the sequence ft, de￿ne
zt =
~ t   (1   )~ t 1

  ft
and observe that ~ t  t =
Pt
=1 tzt=t. Hence to prove the theorem it is su￿cient to prove that
E[jztj] ! 0.
Now let ` be the number of observations in updating to period t that are discarded and let
~ `
t 1 be the frequencies in the remaining sample. Note that we can think of this as drawing M   `
observations from ; ~ t 1 without replacement, and we arbitrarily de￿ne ~ M
t 1 = ~ t 1. Since  < 1 it
is less than some  < 1: By de￿nition
E[jztjj~ t 1;`] = E
"
 
 
~ t   (1   )~ t 1

  ft

 
 
 
~ t 1;`
#
= E
" 
 

`
Mft + M `
M
~ `
t 1   (1   )~ t 1

  ft
 

 


~ t 1;`
#
= E
" 
 

M `
M   (1   )

~ `
t 1  
(1   )[~ t 1   ~ `
t 1]

+
 
`
M

  1
!
ft
 
 


 ~ t 1;`
#
 E
"
 
 
M `
M   (1   )

~ `
t 1

 
 
+

 
 
(1   )[~ t 1   ~ `
t 1]


 
 
+

 
 
 
`
M

  1
!
ft

 
 
 
~ t 1;`
#
 2
 
 
`
M
  1
 
  +
1   


Pr(` > (=
p
)M) + max
`(=
p
)M
E
h 
~ t 1   ~ `
t 1
 

 
~ t 1;`
i
:
where the last line follows from the facts that both ~ `
t 1 ft ;and the di￿erence between ~ `
t 1 ;and
~ t 1 are all between 0 and 1.
Next we observe that
EjXj  2
p
EjXj2
hence it is enough to prove that each of the expectations on the RHS has square deviation that
goes to zero. Examining ￿rst E
 

`
M   1
 

2
recall that  = pk=M and E` = pk, hence we need only
compute the variance of `
M. The variance of ` is p(1 p)k = M(1 p) , so the variance of `
M is
M(1   p)
2M2 
1
M
.
Turning to the second term E
 
~ t 1   ~ `
t 1
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~ t 1;`

observe that E[~ `
t 1j~ t 1;`] = ~ t 1 and
that the variance is bounded above by sampling with replacement, which is at worst 1=(M  
(=
p
)M)  1=(M(1 
p
)). Hence max`L E
h
 ~ t 1   ~ `
t 1

 

 ~ t 1;`
i
 1=(M(1 
p
)) ! 0.
9Theorem. [Theorem 2 in text] For any  there exists a constant B > 0 such that for all util-
ity functions ju(a;y)j  U the recursive memory model with parameters ; satis￿es ct=t 
7Uj1=(t) +  + B=j.
Proof. De￿ne: ~ V () = max v(;), ~ vt =
Pt
=1 v((ht);ft)+
P0
= 1  ~ V (0), ~ t =
Pt
= 1 ,~ ct =
~ tV (t)   ~ vt, ~ c0 = 0. Note that ~ t = t=(1    1) = t= and that
j~ vt   utj=t = j
t X
=1
[v((ht);ft)   u((ht);ft)] +
0 X
= 1
 ~ V (0)j=t  U + (~ 0=t)U:
Our ￿rst step is to show that jct=t   ~ ct=~ tj is small, so that we can focus on bounding ~ ct=~ t.
jct=t   ~ ct=~ tj = j(ct   ~ ct)=t + ~ ct(~ t   t)=(t~ t)j
= j

tU(t)   ut   [~ tV (t)   ~ vt]

=t + ~ ct(~ t   t)=(t~ t)j
 j~ vt   utj=t + j

tU(t)   ~ tV (t)

=t + ~ ct(~ t   t)=(t~ t)j
 U + (~ 0=t)U + jU(t)   (~ t=t)V (t) + ~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
= U + (~ 0=t)U + jU(t)   U(t) + U(t)   V (t) + (t   ~ t)V (t)=t + ~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
 U + (~ 0=t)U + jU(t)   U(t)j + jU(t)   V (t)j + j   ~ 0V (t)=t + ~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
 U + (~ 0=t)U + Ujt   tj + U + j   ~ 0V (t)=tj + j~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
= 2U + (~ 0=t)U + Ujt  
tt
~ t
+
~ 00
~ t
j + j   ~ 0V (t)=tj + j~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
= 2U + (~ 0=t)U + Uj
~ t   t
~ t
t +
~ 00
~ t
j + j   ~ 0V (t)=tj + j~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
= 2U + (~ 0=t)U + Uj
~ t   t
~ t
t +
~ 00
~ t
j + j   ~ 0V (t)=tj + j~ ct~ 0=(t~ t)j
 2U + (~ 0=t)U + 2U
~ 0
~ t
+
~ 0
t
jmaxV ()j +
j~ ct
~ t
j~ 0
t
 2U + 3U
1
t
+
1
t
2U + 2U
1
t
 7U( + 1=(t))
Hence the result holds if we can bound ~ ct=~ t by BU for some B that depends only on . To
do this, we de￿ne the incremental cost ~ gt = ~ ct ~ ct 1, so that ~ ct =
Pt
=1 ~ gt. Observe that if suppose
that ~ gt=t  , then ~ ct=~ t 
Pt
= 1 t=~ t =  so we only need a bound on ~ gt=t. We compute
~ gt = ~ ct   ~ ct 1 = ~ tV (t)   ~ vt   ~ t 1V (t 1) + ~ vt 1
= ~ tV (t)   ~ t 1V (t 1)   tv(^ (t 1);ft)
= ~ tV (ft + (1   )t 1)   ~ t 1V (t 1)   tv(^ (t 1);ft)
 ~ tv(^ (t);ft) + ~ t(1   )v(^ (t);t 1)   ~ t 1V (t 1)   tv(^ (t 1);ft)
 t[v(^ (t);ft)   v(^ (t 1);ft)]   tv(^ (t);t 1) + (~ t 1 + t)v(^ (t);t 1)   ~ t 1V (t 1)
 t[v(^ (t);ft)   v(^ (t 1);ft)]   tv(^ (t);t 1) + tv(^ (t);t 1)
= t[v(^ (t);ft)   v(^ (t 1);ft)]
10Examining the ￿nal term, observe that ^ () and v(;) are Lipschitz continuous and that the
Lipschitz constant has the form BU where B depends only on , hence
~ gt  t[v(^ (t);ft)   v(^ (t 1);ft)]
 t(BU=)kt   t 1k
 tBU=
which now gives the desired overall bound.
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